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The United States Congress recently passed the U.S.
Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act (“CSLCA”). Title
IV of the Act ultimately recognized commercial property rights in
resources extracted from extraterrestrial bodies. Consequently, the
passage of such legislation has once again brought property rights
in outer space to the forefront of legal discussion. Although some
have said that the CSLCA directly conflicts with Article II of the
Outer Space Treaty, the CSLCA should be seen as a valid
interpretation of Article II given the numerous ambiguities
inherent in the article itself. More importantly, the CSCLA acts as
an incremental mechanism in the formation of international space
law that, in turn, should eventually allow States to come to
innovative and cooperative solutions to preserve the Article II
regime amidst future commercial efforts in outer space.
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INTRODUCTION
In the fall of 2015, the United States Congress passed the U.S.
Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act (“CSLCA”).1
Title IV of the Act, Space Resource Exploration and Utilization,
ultimately recognized commercial property rights in resources
extracted from celestial bodies.2 The CSLCA was met with
exuberance by the commercial space sector, but many scholars
declared that the legislation was a violation of international space
law. For example, one commentator equated the law to a “land
1

U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, H.R. 2262, 114th
Cong. (2015).
2
‘Celestial bodies’ is a term used in international space law. For instance, it is
found in the third UN General Assembly that addresses outer space activities,
which states “[o]uter space and celestial bodies are free for exploration and use
by all states.” G.A. Res. 1721 (XVI), International Co-operation in the Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space (Dec. 20, 1961). The term is never defined in the treaty
regime, and it is generally understood to encompass all naturally occurring
bodies in the void of space other than Earth, including the Moon. See, for
instance, the formulation in the Moon Agreement, which states “provisions of
this agreement relating to the Moon shall also apply to the other celestial bodies
within the solar system, other than the Earth . . . .” Agreement Governing the
Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies art. I, Dec. 5, 1979,
1363 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Moon Agreement].
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grab” and suggested that the bill’s authors “should read the space
treaties.”3 Similarly, others felt that it “represent[ed] a full-frontal
attack on settled principles of space law,”4 or that the law violated
the Outer Space Treaty regime altogether.5 The narrative in such
backlash conceptualizes international space law, specifically
Article II of the Outer Space Treaty, as set with static content.6
Critics of the CSLCA may forget that the Outer Space Treaty
was written in contemplation of innovation. The drafters were
writing law for technology that was uncertain in its development,
yet an immediate threat to international peace and security. As a
result, they drafted broadly defined principles to preserve space for
peaceful uses, but left States a wide latitude of negotiation as to the
specific content of those principles. This was done so that the law
could adapt as the technology emerged. Thus, innovation can be
said to be a specific value that is embedded in international space
law. Indeed, the Outer Space Treaty itself is an example of legal
innovation.
It is in this context that this article casts its opinion on the
passage of the US Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act
and its title on Space Resource Exploration and Utilization. This
article argues that the new law constitutes State interpretation of
Article II of the Outer Space Treaty and that it is a critical piece to
the puzzle in determining the meaning of the content of Article II.
3

See Trevor Batch, Obama’s New Push to Mine Outer Space Could Spark a
Disaster, Miami Professor Warns, MIAMI NEW TIMES, (Dec. 10, 2015),
http://www.miaminewtimes.com/news/obamas-new-push-to-mine-outer-spacecould-spark-a-disaster-miami-professor-warns-8105384 (quoting Dr. Sylvia
Ospina).
4
See, e.g., Gbenga Oduntan, Who Owns Space? U.S. Asteroid-Mining Act is
Dangerous and Potentially Illegal, THE CONVERSATION, (Nov. 25, 2015),
https://theconversation.com/who-owns-space-us-asteroid-mining-act-isdangerous-and-potentially-illegal-51073.
5
U.S. Space-Mining Law Seen Leading to Possible Treaty Violations, CBC
NEWS (Nov. 26, 2015), http://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/space-mining-ustreaty-1.3339104 (citing Ram Jakhu).
6
Tanja Masson-Zwaan & Bob Richards, International Perspectives on Space
Resource Rights, SPACE NEWS (Dec. 8, 2015), http://spacenews.com/op-edinternational-perspectives-on-space-resource-rights/ (“[T]hese opinions are
largely independent ones and not supported by international consensus.”).
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Therefore, Part I of this article discusses the ambiguities inherent
in Article II and reflects upon how these ambiguities leave the
content of Article II open for negotiation. Part II provides a brief
overview of Title IV of the CSLCA and provides a surface-level
analysis as to how such legislation complies with certain
provisions of the Outer Space Treaty. Part III argues that domestic
legislation can be important in determining the content of
international law. This part also includes an analysis of Title IV of
the CSLCA in this context. The final section of this Article
concludes by reflecting on the possible impact that CSLCA may
have on the content of international space law.
I.
AMBIGUOUS ARTICLE II
Article II of the Outer Space Treaty is fraught with ambiguity.
It not only fails “to anticipate all the realities of our current
world,”7 but also seems to purposely use language that allows for
multiple conflicting interpretations that are not always
reconcilable. Even when confronted with a “plain language”8
reading using the purpose and scope of the treaty, Article II still
defies a universally accepted definition. This is in large part due to
the Cold War atmosphere that pervaded negotiations of the Outer
Space Treaty.9 As a result, Article II is drafted in such a way that
allows it to bend to political ideology. On the one hand, Article II
can be read in conjunction with Article I to support a socialist
reading that reflects communitarian exploitation of space for the
“benefit and in the interests of all countries.”10 On the other hand,
Article II can be read from a liberal viewpoint that frees space
from State sovereignty, but contemplates the development of
7

Id.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
9
See Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz, Space Law: Its Cold War Origins and
Challenges in the Era of Globalization, 37 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1041, 1046
(2004).
10
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies art. II,
Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space
Treaty].
8
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commercial activities as a “use of space.”11 A better reading of
Article II is likely neither socialist nor liberal. Instead, it should be
read as anti-imperial or anti-colonial, which represents a common
ground between Soviet communism and liberalism in the
American tradition. Article II is carefully worded to exclude
imperial logics from extending into space, while avoiding
ideological differences. This section elaborates upon three specific
ambiguities: the concept of “use and occupation,” the issue of
private actors, and the issue of resource extraction as a type of
appropriation.12 The first two of these issues are dealt with briefly,
and the final one receives an in depth analysis as it cuts to the core
of the non-appropriation principle of the Outer Space Treaty
regime.
A. Use and Occupation
Article II of the Outer Space Treaty states, “Outer space,
including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to
national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or
occupation, or by any other means.”13 It is clear that Article II, in
conjunction with Article I,14 establishes a regime of res communis
in outer space.15 In short, the Treaty regime allows for the free use
and exploration of outer space and prohibits any claims of
sovereignty as mechanism for establishing the first right.
Specifically, Article II implements a ban on appropriating space
through use or occupation.16 This language was chosen to
differentiate outer space from terrestrial territories that can be
subject to claims of national appropriation. In fact, use and
occupation are not necessarily unlawful as a result of Article II.
11

Id. art. II.
See id.
13
See id. art. II.
14
Id. art. I (“Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall
be free for exploration and use by all States without discrimination of any kind,
on a basis of equality and in accordance with international law, and there shall
be free access to all areas of celestial bodies.”).
15
See ANTHONY AUST, HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 40 (2d ed.
2010); see also MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 382 (4th ed. 1997).
16
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 10, art. I-II.
12
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Article I endorses States’ explicit rights to the “exploration and
use” of outer space.17 Similarly, Article XII grants rights of
reciprocal access to “stations, installations, equipment, and space
vehicles on the Moon and other celestial bodies,” meaning that the
drafters contemplated the possibility of occupation in terms of
inhabitation.18 Since the Outer Space Treaty acknowledges the
possibility of use and occupation by States, Article II’s prohibition
is a very specific one—it is a prohibition on sovereign
appropriation that historically resulted from such use and
occupation.19
This bifurcation of legal occupation from sovereignty is
consistent with the post-colonial values that inform our
understanding of Article II. The exclusion of sovereignty
decreased incentives for States to engage in a tension heavy
extraterritorial land grab, yet left the door open for innovation
through a cooperative structure. The nature of this cooperative
structure, elaborated upon in Article IX,20 is admittedly vague, but
it is only meant to be a framework in which to structure the
negotiations over new technologies. The ambiguity caused by the
potential for long term presence on a celestial body is resolved by
requiring the legal structure governing that presence to flow from a
claim of jurisdiction distinct from territorial sovereignty. This is
why Articles VI21 and VIII22 provide for, and require, other

17

Outer Space Treaty, supra note 10, art. I.
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 10, art. XII.
19
FRANCIS LYALL & PAUL B. LARSEN, SPACE LAW: A TREATISE 60-61
(Ashgate Publishing, Ltd. 2013) (noting it is the “intention to act as sovereign in
relation to the occupied location,” and not the occupation itself.).
20
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 10, art. IX (“States Parties to the Treaty
shall be guided by the principle of cooperation and mutual assistance and shall
conduct all their activities in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial
bodies, with due regard to the corresponding interests of all other States Parties
to the Treaty.”).
21
Id. art. VI (“States Parties to the Treaty shall bear international
responsibility for national activities in outer space . . . .”).
22
Id. art. VIII (“A State Party to the Treaty on whose registry an object
launched into outer space is carried shall retain jurisdiction and control over
such object . . . .”).
18
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methods to extend State jurisdiction to fit commercial enterprises
within the cooperative structure.
B. Private Actors
The second ambiguity caused by Article II is its application to
private actors. This was the central claim in Nemitz v. United
States.23 Nemitz, a United States citizen, asserted ownership of an
asteroid and attempted to collect rent from NASA for space
occupied on the asteroid by one of its spacecraft.24 In his claim,
Nemitz asserted that the Outer Space Treaty is a treaty among
States and thus did not apply to him as an individual.25 While
Nemitz is an absurd case, it does raise a valid question of how
Article II creates obligations for individuals. In other words, how
can individuals be precluded from territorial appropriation?
Scholars have been divided on the matter.26 Those who assert
that the Treaty applies to private actors counter arguments such as
Nemitz’s by pointing to the “any other means” language included
in Article II.27 An extreme construction of this argument claims
that a State grant of property rights to private actors is functionally
an act of territorial appropriation, characterizing private property
rights as appropriation “by any other means.”28
Neither of these extremes fully captures the entire scope of the
ambiguity. These two extremes treat Article II as a binary that is
either on or off. The true ambiguity within Article II is not whether
23

Nemitz v. United States, No. CV-N030599-HDM (RAM), 2004 WL
3167042 at *1 (D. Nev. Apr. 26, 2004) aff’d sub nom. Nemitz v. N.A.S.A., 126
F. App’x 343 (9th Cir. 2005).
24
Id.
25
See Robert Kelly, Nemitz v. United States, A Case of First Impression:
Appropriation, Private Property Rights and Space Law before the Federal
Courts of the United States, 30 J. SPACE L. 297, 300-01 (2004).
26
See, e.g., W.N. White Jr., Interpreting Article II of the Outer Space Treaty,
46th Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space 175 (2003); Stephen Gorove,
Interpreting Article II of the Outer Space Treaty, 11th Colloquium on the Law
of Outer Space 40 (1968) (acknowledging that Article II of the Treaty does not
expressly prevent private appropriation of outer space).
27
See Carl O. Christol, Article 2 of the 1967 Principles Treaty Revisited in
OUTER SPACE: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND POLICY 78, 78-82 (1997).
28
See LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 19, at 184-85.
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it applies to private actors, but what limitations it places on the
State’s ability to enable these private actors. Article II is extended
to private actors through Article VI, which imputes upon States
“international responsibility” for their non-governmental actors.29
The effect of this clause is not to pass an international obligation to
the individual that would result in an international crime. Instead, it
makes the acts of non-governmental actors attributable to the State
as contemplated in Article 11 of the Articles on State
Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts.30 This means that
a State is obligated to maintain control over all commercial actors,
but it must extend rights and obligations to them within a narrow
jurisdictional framework constructed by Article II, Article VI, and
Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty.31
This does not preclude commercial activity, but it creates an
interesting problem vis a vis property rights. Private interests are
protected by States through a system of property rights including
real, chattel, and intellectual property.32 Real property is directly
connected to territorial sovereignty as well as the protection of
private and commercial rights. This is why some argue that the

29

Outer Space Treaty, supra note 10, art. VI; see also International Institute of
Space Law, Statement by the Board of Directors of the International Institute of
Space Law (IISL) On Claims to Property Rights Regarding The Moon and Other
Celestial
Bodies,
http://www.iislweb.org/docs/IISL_Outer_Space_Treaty_Statement.pdf
(“[A]ccording to international law, and pursuant to Article VI, the activities of
non-governmental entities (private parties) are national activities. The
prohibition of national appropriation by Article II thus includes appropriation by
non-governmental entities (i.e. private entities whether individuals or
corporations) since that would be a national activity . . . . [Therefore],
[a]ccording to international law, States party to a treaty are under a duty to
implement the terms of that treaty within their national legal systems.”).
30
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts art. 11, G.A. Res.
56/83, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83 (Jan. 28, 2002) (“Conduct which is not
attributable to a State under the preceding articles shall nevertheless be
considered an act of that State under international law if and to the extent that
the State acknowledges and adopts the conduct in question as its own.”).
31
See supra notes 10, 21-22 and accompanying text.
32
See JOHN A. MCKINSEY & DEBRA D. BURKE, CARPER’S UNDERSTANDING
THE LAW 424 (7th ed. 2015).

168

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 18: 160

“use” of outer space should be limited both spatially and
temporally.33
Article II then runs a gauntlet by allowing States to permit
commercial activity, a liberal value, but tying it closely to the
persona of the State, a socialist value. As a result, commercial
activities are limited by a State’s ability to authorize activities that
would result in a “national appropriation.”34 Therefore, the real
ambiguity is the scope of activities that a State can control without
appropriating space or celestial bodies.
C. The Exploitation of Natural Resources
These first two ambiguities lead to the third ambiguity, which
is the central question raised by Title IV of the CSLCA—whether
the principles of res communis prohibit the exploitation of
removable resources in outer space. The connection between
appropriation and resource extraction is a critical point of
contestation in the literature on Article II, although Article II “does
not prohibit the extraction and appropriation of natural
resources.”35 Despite the lack of a textual, affirmative prohibition,
Article II does place some limitations on States vis a vis their
ability to extract resources as Article II may “constitut[e] an
absolute legal barrier in the realization of every kind of space
activity.”36 This paper argues that this is the result of a postcolonial construction that sought to prevent the spatial expansion
of geopolitics. Consequently, there is an undefined gap between
the act of “appropriating” and the act of “using” space resources.

33

See, e.g., Brendan Cohen, Use Versus Appropriation of Outer Space: The
Case for Long-Term Occupancy Rights, 2014 INT’L INST. SPACE LAW PROC. 35,
35-52.
34
See Center For Research of Air and Space Law, International and
Interdisciplinary Workshop on Policy and Law Relating to Outer Space
Resources: Examples of the Moon, Mars and Other Celestial Bodies, 16 (2006)
(“This prohibition of appropriation by states extends through Art. IV of the
Outer Space Treaty also to privacy nationals.”).
35
Id.
36
I.H.PH. DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR, AN INTRODUCTION TO SPACE LAW 28 (2d
rev. ed., 1999).
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Writing in the period between the end of the Second World
War and the dawn of the Space Age, legal theorist Carl Schmitt
argued that the history of international law could be traced through
“land appropriation,” which is the “primeval act in founding
law.”37 Schmitt’s analysis is meant to illustrate that post-1945
international law was meant to construct a new spatial order to
govern the entirety of the globe. This order entrenched borders by
linking sovereignty to territory.38 The entrenchment of territorial
borders was a mechanism through which the great powers sought
to contain the imperial impulses that had repeatedly led to war. The
emergence of space technology presented a fundamental challenge
to the spatial order of international law by opening up the
possibility of the spatial expansion of the State. The Outer Space
Treaty brings space technology into international law, and Article
II is an attempt to maintain the spatial order constructed by the
United Nations Charter.
Therefore, complications result when Article II is read to
implicate property rights directly, since “appropriation” is
primarily concerned with the expansion of State territory, not
property. It is the indirect connection between the spatial concepts
of territory and property that creates an unresolved ambiguity.
Some scholars would assert that general prohibition against claims
of sovereignty in outer space extend to the exploitation of natural
resources.39 For instance, noted scholar Stephen Gorove asserts that
“because the Outer Space Treaty never makes a distinction
between outer space and its natural resources . . . the term outer
space must be understood as resources. Moreover, the
appropriation of natural resources for the exclusive benefit of the
user appears to be in contrast with [Article I].”40 Such
37

CARL SCHMITT, THE NOMOS OF THE EARTH IN THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
THE JUS PUBLICUM EUROPAEUM 45 (G.L. Ulmen trans, Telos Press ed., 2003).
38

See U.N. Charter art. 2(4).
See, e.g., STEPHEN GOROVE, STUDIES IN SPACE LAW: ITS CHALLENGES AND
PROSPECTS 82 (Sijthoff A. Leiden ed., 1977) (“[A]ny use involving consumption
or taking [of natural resources] with intention of keeping for one’s own
exclusive use would amount to appropriation.”).
40
FABIO TRONCHETTI, THE EXPLOITATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES OF THE
MOON AND OTHER CELESTIAL BODIES – A PROPOSAL FOR A LEGAL REGIME 32
(2009) (citing Stephen Gorove, Limitations on the Principles of Freedom of
39
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interpretations compress territory, real property, and chattel
property in such a way that resource extraction is a functional
equivalent to appropriation. In contrast, other commentators have
argued that the right to freely explore and use outer space is
analogous with the rules underlying other res communis regimes
such as the high seas.41 In sum, these authors argue that “States
[and private actors] are entitled to appropriate outer space natural
resources so long as their activities do not involve any permanent
appropriation of . . . the areas in which resources are appropriated
and until such activities do not prevent other[s] . . . from doing the
same.”42
Again, while both of these groups make compelling arguments,
it is important to remember that Article II applies to the concept of
territory and not to property. Article II functions to exclude outer
space from the territory of States, thus appropriation only occurs
when property rights flow from territorial claims.43 Therefore, we
must inquire about the legal condition of property in spatial areas
designated outside the borders of any State. In international law,
such areas are known res communis and are held as a global

Exploration and Use in Outer Space, 13th Colloquium on the Law of Outer
Space 40 (1970)).
41
See BIN CHENG, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW 230 (1997); CARL
Q. CHRISTOL, THE MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OUTER SPACE 41 (1982)
(referencing the Outer Space Treaty’s corresponding travaux preparatoires).
42
TRONCHETTI, supra note 40, at 221 (emphasis added) (citing Outer Space
Treaty, art. IX.).
43
Although Article I does require that use and exploration be done for the
benefit and interests of all States, this obligation is a soft one. This is different
from the “common heritage of mankind” principle as applied to the deep sea
bed, which places an obligation on states to share the resources that they gain
from the deep sea bed. There is no firm obligation on how to share these
benefits, and as such, sharing has occurred on an ad hoc basis, such as the
sharing of satellite remote sensing data. See generally, G.A. Res. 51/122, Annex
¶ 2, Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space for the Benefit and in the Interest of All States, Taking into
Particular Account the Needs of Developing Countries (Dec. 13, 1996) (“States
are free to determine all aspects of their participation in international
cooperation in the exploration and use of outer space on an equitable and
mutually acceptable basis.”).
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commons by the international system.44 Global commons is a legal
typology; it is a term used to denote an area that is outside of the
sovereign control of a nation-state and not subject to claims of
territorial sovereignty. Two aspects of this delineation should be
made clear.
First, the term global commons is a typology of legal space in
international law. This is important because the term “commons”
finds its roots in Roman law as well as English common law, but
has traditionally been used to address economic or property
interests. This has caused confusion because commons in
international law, at its core, is a settlement of territory and not
property.45 While economic and property interests are implicated in
spatial settlements, international law is structured through the
allocation territory among sovereigns to avert international
conflict.46 Global commons, as part of this spatial matrix, is
primarily about rights of exclusion maintained by States.
Second, as a legal typology, the global commons is a term that
only has general legal content. It can only describe the legal state
of a global commons in the least restrictive sense. It follows that
each commons has its own internal lex specialis that applies within
the framework of international law. Thus, the high seas,47 the deep
seabed,48 Antarctica,49 and outer space all have distinct legal
regimes that create unique rights and obligations for States. This
44

See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
Some argue that outer space is not a “global commons.” Such analysis
mistakenly treats Article II as primarily concerned with property and engages in
a historical analysis of “commons.” This mistake is further complicated by the
assertion that because the word “commons” does not appear in the Outer Space
Treaty, which ignores “global commons” as a legal typology in international
law. See, e.g., HENRY HERTZFELD, BRIAN WEEDEN & CHRISTOPHER D.
JOHNSON, HOW SIMPLE TERMS MISLEAD US: THE PITFALLS OF THINKING ABOUT
OUTER SPACE AS A COMMONS, 2015 INT’L ASTRONAUTICAL CONGRESS
PROCEEDINGS, http://swfound.org/media/205285/how-simple-terms-mislead-ushertzfeld-johnson-weeden-iac-2015.pdf.
46
Such a concept has been described as the “bracketing of war.” SCHMITT,
supra note 37, at 55.
47
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea arts. 86-120, Nov. 16, 1994, 1833
U.N.T.S. 3. [hereinafter UNCLOS].
48
See id. at arts. 122-23 (defining enclosed or semi-enclosed seas).
49
The Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794. 402 U.N.T.S. 71.
45
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means that for each global commons, States are free to adopt a lex
specialis that they perceive as the proper balance between
international peace and security and their own self-interests. Each
commons results from a settlement that reflects the physical
characteristics of the area, current technology, historical
perspectives, and specific geopolitics at the time of negotiation.
With such consideration, States can allow for the presence of
national jurisdictions within these spaces.
The crux of the question is whether an appropriation of
territorial sovereignty occurs “by any other means” through the
extraction of outer space resources.50 In the face of this interpretive
ambiguity, many have turned to the analogy of the law of the sea
and the extraction of fish on the high seas.51 While the analogy is
limited in its ability to elucidate specific legal principles, it does
confirm the existence of legal extraction of resources in a global
commons. In both the law of the sea and the law of Antarctica,
resource extraction is addressed in specific clauses that make clear
the extent to which commercial extraction can occur.52 Resource
extraction for commercial purposes therefore can be interpreted as
a valid “use” under general international law governing global
commons, and the lack of a specific clause prohibiting such
extraction within the body of space law is indicative of it being a
valid use within the lex specialis of outer space. To that end,
Article II leaves significant gaps that cannot be filled by
comparison to other global commons which specify the extent to

50

Outer Space Treaty, supra note 10, art. II.
See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
52
The “high seas” is designated as an area of broad liberal usage. See
UNCLOS, supra note 47, art. 87. The extraction of resources from the deep
seabed is governed by an international authority. See id. art. 136-37, 156. Any
commercial exploitation of mineral resources in Antarctica is prohibited.
Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty art. 7, Jan. 14,
1998. Resource extraction was one of the issues that the Moon Agreement was
supposed to resolve through adoption of a system similar to the deep sea bed.
See Moon Agreement, supra note 2, art. XI; see also Fabio Tronchetti, Moon
Agreement in the 21st Century: Addressing Its Potential Role in the Era of
Commercial Exploitation of the Natural Resources of the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies, 36 J. SPACE L. 489 (2010).
51

DEC 2016] The Exploitation of Resources in Outer Space

173

which States can exploit resources. In sum, failed agreements53 to
cure this error signifies that the specific prohibitions regarding
extraterrestrial resource extraction and exploitation contained
Article II are unsettled.
II. THE CSCLA
As noted, the Title IV of the CSLCA is the most recent, and
most profound, American interpretation of the Article II regime.
This particular piece of domestic legislation has developed over
the course of several years to finally reveal the United States’
position on the exploitation of natural resources by private
commercial actors in relation to its Outer Space Treaty obligations.
This section first provides a brief overview of the development of
the text of Title IV. The next section then provides a surface-level
analysis regarding Title IV’s compatibility with the provisions of
the Outer Space Treaty.
A. Development of CSCLA Title IV
In 2014, the House Committee on Science, Space, and
Technology received the newly introduced “American Space
Technology for Exploring Resource Opportunities In Deep Space
Act,” or the “ASTEROIDS Act.”54 Although this bill may not have
been introduced as one that could become actual legislation, the
proposed legislation did lead to discussion of private property
rights in outer space that ultimately led to the inclusion of Title IV
in the CSLCA.
The ASTEROIDS Act explicitly provided property rights
over outer space resources to private commercial entities.55 That is,
the legislation stated that, “[a]ny resources obtained in outer space
from an asteroid are the property of the entity that obtained such
resources, which shall be entitled to all property rights thereto,
consistent with applicable provisions of Federal law.”56 Although
53
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this phrase in itself does not necessarily abrogate “existing
international obligations of the United States”57 by explicitly
asserting claims of sovereignty over said resources, a literal
reading of this text, absent a definition58 of outer space resources,
does in fact allow one to conclude that American legislators may
have incidentally undermined the core principles of Article II by
providing property rights that may conflict with the obligation to
not appropriate space by means of use or occupation.59
This particular concern remained as the initial
ASTEROIDS Act proceeded to be amended. In regards to House
Bill 1508 (“H.R. 1508”) or the “Space Resources Exploration and
Utilization Act of 2015,”60 a group of commentators believed that
“the bill [as drafted] could be read to allow for expansive territorial
claims over both asteroids and planetary surfaces well beyond
what can be justified on the basis of Article IX’s non-interference
principle . . . .”61 Such a matter was only complicated by a
seemingly broad, yet narrow, definition of outer spaces resources
and a subsequent provision that assigned private property rights
only to resources extracted from an asteroid.62 Ultimately, the
initial drafts of the ASTEROIDS Act and H.R. 1508 were amended
to become Title IV of CSLCA and signed into law by President
Barack Obama on November 25, 2015.63 It should be noted that
57
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Title IV was tacked onto a larger bill that contained a number of
critical updates to United States space law.64 These changes had
little to nothing to do with extraterrestrial resources and were
primarily concerned with improving government administration of
the increasing commercialization of space. Incorporating Title IV
into this larger bill likely made the controversial legislation easier
to pass.
B. Initial Impressions of CSCLA Title IV
On its face, the CSLCA’s provision regarding private property
rights in outer space seems to be only a more specific description
of the rights proposed by the initial ASTEROIDS Act. The Act’s
provision regarding private ownership of resources in outer space
states:
A United States citizen engaged in commercial recovery of
an asteroid resource or a space resource under this chapter
shall be entitled to any asteroid resource or space resource
obtained, including to possess, own, transport, use, and sell
the asteroid resource or space resource obtained in
accordance with applicable law, including the international
obligations of the United States.65
This change in language is quite important. Instead of granting
the ambiguous “property rights,” Title IV enumerates certain rights
from the traditional bundle of rights that a commercial entity might
have over chattel property.66 Therefore, the rights granted by Title
IV are narrower than the rights granted in the ASTEROIDS Act,
making them less likely to run afoul of the prohibitions found in
Article II.
Simply put, this particular language does a better job in
ensuring that private entities only have property rights to resources
extracted from asteroids or other celestial bodies. Moreover, the
64
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more specific definition of outer space resources as contained in
the Act further insinuates that private entities only have rights to
resources and not to the body from which they were extracted. In
that respect, the Act specifically defines two categories of
resources: asteroid resources67 and space resources.68 It further
elaborates the definition of space resources to include “water and
minerals.”69 By narrowly defining the rights that entities have to
such resources, American legislators have arguably avoided
showing an intent to allow private entities to have exclusive
control over a celestial body or a portion of a celestial body from
which resources could be extracted. In fact, the concluding
language of the Act, language that was absent in both the
ASTEROIDS Act and H.R. 1508, explicitly reaffirms the United
States’ intent to comply with Article II by stating, “this Act . . .
does not thereby assert sovereignty or sovereign or exclusive rights
or jurisdiction over, or the ownership of, any celestial body.”70
Despite the United States’ attempt to demonstrate that it
does not condone violations of Article II, Title IV does not contain
many explicit provisions that would necessarily prevent private
entities from compromising other important Treaty provisions,
specifically Article IX’s prohibition against “harmful
interference.”71 For example, a private entity could rightfully lay
claim to resources from an asteroid or other celestial body, but
could wrongfully make a claim of “harmful interference” against
another party who may attempt to extract resources from the same
body that is not subject to the jurisdiction of any one State or
private actor. This in effect would violate the principle of Article II
by indirectly laying exclusive claims to a particular body in outer
space. In this context though, it must be noted that a reporting
requirement was included requiring the President to prepare a
report on “the authorities necessary to meet the international
obligations of the United States, including authorization and
67
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continuing supervision by the Federal Government.”72 Ultimately,
while hypothetical violations can be posited, it seems as though the
United States intends to promulgate regulations that fulfill its
obligations under Article II as well as Article VI and Article IX of
the Outer Space Treaty.
III. THE CSLCA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
As noted above, one of the primary criticisms of Title IV of the
CSLCA is that it violates Article II of the Outer Space Treaty.73 In
light of the ambiguities laid out in the initial sections of this article,
this position seems fraught with problems. If, as this Article
argues, the content of Article II is yet to be determined, then a
more balanced approach is to read Title IV as a state interpretation
of the content of Article II. To that end, this section proceeds in
two parts. The first part discusses how domestic legislation can
help build the meaning of international law. Consequently, the
second part analyzes Title IV in this schema of international law.
A. Filling the Gaps in International Law
The ambiguities of Article II cannot be sufficiently resolved by
applying a few general sources of international law. In fact, the
interpretation and application of international obligations are
ultimately dependent upon the actions of various States as they
engage in the process of fulfilling their treaty obligations. This
means that international law grows incrementally as States act and
react within legal lacunae. Analysis of the incremental growth of
law can assist in deciphering how Article II has developed beyond
its text in regards to resource extraction.
Noted scholar Michael Reisman argued that “international
incidents” form the “epistemic units” on which international law is
built.74 Under Reisman’s international incident model, international
law is formed at decision points in which practitioners, such as
72
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diplomats, interpret and apply the law, much like a judge in a
common law system.75 What Reisman’s scholarship indicates is
that the content of international law is a function of State
interpretation which can be observed as States face unexpected
incidents that reveal rifts in international law. These epistemic
moments reveal the political construction of the law, as well as the
extent to which States understand their own international
obligations.76
Reisman’s work gives a lens to international law that takes us
beyond the text of a treaty and into the construction of content
across time and space. International incidents serve as glosses on
the formal text of international law as found in treaties or custom.
There is no need to limit these epistemic units to Reisman’s
“international incidents.” International law is extremely amorphous
in nature, and while the “text” of international law comes from
traditional negotiations within international fora, the content of
international law is often in the subtext derived from multiple
points of informal negotiation.
Such processes are revealed in the academic interest in the
formation of “soft law” in international space law.77 Soft law
comes in many forms, which are all understood to be non-binding
agreements such as technical guidelines or best practices.78 Soft
law is indicative of the rhizomatic nature of norm development in
international space law. The old model characterized by the active
negotiation of treaties has increasingly given way to less formal
mechanisms through which States are defining the nature of
responsible behavior in space.79 This does not mean that the well of
75
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space law has dried. Rather, it is indicative of numerous springs
welling up and contributing to the flow of international space law.
Soft law and international incidents represent two of these
types of sources. Specific to this article, domestic law and policy
can be another source of law that States use to fill the gaps found
in international law. An excellent example of this is the migration
of “non-discriminatory access” to remote sensing data from
domestic American law into the United Nations Principles on
Remote Sensing.80 In essence, States are still negotiating the
content of international space law, but that “negotiation” is not
happening in the formal sense of a diplomatic meeting of State
parties. It is instead happening in an arena of complexity that might
be more akin to a multidimensional chess game. In such an arena,
States often interpret international law and pose that interpretation
to the international community through domestic action. This
“conversation” begins to mark the contours of the content of
international law.81
As States work out the content of ambiguous terms in
international law, State legislation plays an important role in
revealing state interpretations of legal rights and obligations,
especially when States enact legislation that is meant to comport
with international law. In such scenarios, the legislation itself
becomes an important epistemic unit in analyzing the content of
80
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international law. This phenomenon is not native to space law.
Domestic law making should not be confused with international
law making in a formal sense, and this article does not argue that
recent American legislation on extraterrestrial resource extraction
constitutes international law. Instead, this article argues that the
Act represents the United States’ understanding of its obligations
under Article II. This position places other States in the position of
wrestling with these terms and determining whether the United
States legislation is a valid interpretation of the Outer Space Treaty
regime.
B. Reconciling the CSLCA with Article II of the Outer Space
Treaty
The threshold question surrounding Title IV is whether the Act
violates Article II of the Outer Space Treaty. The ambiguities that
fragment Article II indicate multiple valid interpretations of the
law and give no clear interpretation based in the text of
international space law itself.82 In this light, the United States
interpretation is not precluded by the text of the Treaty, especially
in light of the careful language contained in the Act that
acknowledges and incorporates the international obligations found
in the Treaty itself. Indeed, the U.S. legislation specifically
disclaims territorial sovereignty, which is tied directly to the nonappropriation principle in Article II.83 It should be made clear,
however, that a disclaimer of territorial sovereignty is not a
disclaimer of national jurisdiction. National jurisdiction extends
into all global commons through a variety of means and, in space,
specifically through Article VI and Article VIII of the Outer Space
Treaty.84 The extension of jurisdiction is not a de facto extension of
sovereignty, as can be seen in Article VIII of the Treaty which
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affirmatively grants to States “jurisdiction and control” over
spacecraft on their registries.85
What this means is that this important concern in relation to
Title IV is not whether it violates international law but instead,
what it tells us about the content of Article II. This distinction
focuses on Title IV as a valid interpretation of Article II but not
necessarily the valid interpretation of Article II. As an epistemic
unit in the negotiation of international law, Title IV is a State
interpretation that raises questions of whether other States will
accept the interpretation or not.86 Contemporary geopolitics aside,
if all other States decided to reject the United States interpretation
as a rule of custom, they would force the United States to either
capitulate or to maintain status as a persistent objector of sorts.87
States are just as capable of coming together and forging
agreements that make resource extraction subject to a regime such
as the Deep Seabed Authority as contemplated in the Moon
Agreement.88 States can negotiate the particular legal structures
governing specific activities in the outer space environment, thus
indicating that Title IV’s importance will be measured in the extent
to which the international community confirms or negates the
American position. To date, there has been no outright diplomatic
reaction.
Ultimately, the significance of Title IV, is in its ability to shape
the future content of international space law. Since States are free
to reject or accept the U.S. interpretation of Title IV, international
reaction will be of the utmost importance. Unless States reject the
interpretation, the howls of “illegality” coming from numerous
academics will be like trees falling in empty woods. In short, Title
IV can be read as the continuation of U.S. State practice in relation
85
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to Article II. For instance, the plaque at the base of the American
flag planted by the Apollo 12 mission disclaims sovereignty, yet
the United States extracted resources in the form of moon rocks
and maintains ownership over those rocks.89 Title IV extends a
similar right to resource extraction without territorial claims to
private actors. If other States do not contest this extension, then it
is reasonable to interpret Title IV as legislation that represents a
step towards defining the content of Article II and the law
concerning the specific activity of space mining.
This does not mean that Title IV represents a settlement of the
content of Article II. Indeed, Title IV does not even represent a
final settlement of US domestic law in relation to extraterrestrial
resource extraction as evinced by the reporting requirements on the
proper regulatory regime to manage these activities.90 Title IV does
represent an incremental advance in our understanding of the
international rights and obligations contained within the
ambiguous text, and it may very well be an important epistemic
point as commercial actors further imbricate themselves in use and
exploration of outer space.
IV. DEVELOPING INTERNATIONAL LAW
If Title IV does become an accepted interpretation of Article II
by States, then a number of issues will arise that must be addressed
at the international level because the extension of State jurisdiction
over commercial entities operating in outer space will require
States to establish a regime through which these activities can be
coordinated. This regime will be needed to, among other things,
ensure safe and sustainable operations in space, to ensure
commercial actors’ investments in operations, and to maintain
international peace and security in space activities. Title IV
represents a possible avenue through which States may engage in
cooperative efforts to preserve the Article II regime while at the
89
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same time facilitating the development of commercial resource
extraction in outer space.91
As suggested above, one of the core goals of international law
is to structure a stable and peaceful existence among States. As a
result, States negotiate international law as sovereign equals that
must balance between their own self-interests and the interests of
the international community as a whole. States are often
confronted with the need to address evolving technology and its
tendency to challenge core questions of sovereignty. For instance,
international telecommunications under the International
Telecommunication Union (“ITU”) and international aviation
under International Civil Aviation Organization (“ICAO”) are both
examples of international collaboration on technical issues that
carry political implications.92 These regimes represent the ability of
States to adopt technical regimes that do not compromise the core
principle of territorial sovereignty.
Space resource extraction presents a similar problem in that it
begs the non-trivial question of the point at which an “exploration
and use” of outer space becomes an appropriation through which a
State has extended its sovereign territorial claims. This raises a
question that was not fully contemplated in the post-1945
settlement.93 Technology in 1945 was a challenge because it
permeated borders, but space technology forced international law
to contend with a new ability to extend borders. Article II is an
attempt to “extraterritorialize” outer space and celestial bodies.
States, in light of the uncertainties in evolving technologies, were
unable to directly answer the limits of state power within a new,
undefined global commons which results in the Article II
ambiguities. It is submitted that there is no immediate need for
States to resolve directly the limits of State power in outer space.
This paper argues that the international community, without ever
91
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touching on problematic issues of sovereignty, can pursue
mechanisms that could engender stability through international
coordination. By focusing on technical standards and coordination
of information sharing, such as that seen in ICAO or the ITU,
States can engage in a cooperative regime that both secures outer
space and facilitates its use and exploration.
Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty becomes critical in
developing such a regime. If States agree at the international level
on standards of conduct, then those standards can be implemented
domestically through Article VI’s authorization and supervision
requirements.94 For instance, safety standards create specific rules
that guide responsible conduct and maintain predictability in a
given environment. For example, though not explicitly classified as
safety standards, the coordination process maintained by the ITU
in regards to the geosynchronous orbit ultimately encourages
responsible conduct and predictability in this sphere of outer
space.95 In the context of the ITU, this allows States to divorce
political questions from that of safe operations, which allows them
to explicitly avoid the implicit question of sovereignty and its
fundamental ambiguities.
It is posited then, that in order to achieve the goals of security
and sustainability in space as well as commercial uses of outer
space, States will need to expand their cooperation in the field of
technical safety standards and information sharing. This can, and
likely will, develop incrementally from a variety of directions. The
domestic legislation of various States will play a role by setting
legal parameters for subsets of actors, and these laws will in turn
formulate accepted practices maintained by certain operators.
Indeed, the power of domestic legislation to create internationally
accepted standards can be seen in the proliferation of the
“maximum probable loss standard” from US law and into the laws
94
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of a variety of nations.96 In addition to domestic legislation, States
can also pursue law and policy options at the international level.
This includes using mechanisms that increase information sharing
such as the Hague Code of Conduct,97 agreements that set out state
best practices like the IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines,98
formal treaties, technical standards, and even international
organizations. Indeed, this is the approach that was adopted by the
United Nations Group of Governmental Experts, which endorsed
the development of transparency and confidence building measures
as critical to the continued safety and security of outer space.
Safety standards and information sharing facilitate routine
interactions and decrease operational risk by increasing
predictability. This decreases the risk of conflict through mishap in
a high security environment. Not only do these standards increase
security among States, but they also facilitate commercial
enterprises by increasing certainty for commercial investors. As
the need for coordination increases with the proliferation of actors
and technologies, safety has the unique ability to serve as the
common language through which States can maximize self-interest
through international coordination.
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CONCLUSION
Since the bulk of companies that are seeking to take advantage
of the new United States regulations are still decks of PowerPoint
slides seeking funding, the nation is likely decades away from
seeing the first resource extraction activities in outer space. This
means that the debate over Article II and Title IV is likely to
continue, but will ultimately be decided by the international
community. Consequently, whether the United States interpretation
is accepted or not will be important, but it is equally important to
track how the law develops in other countries and specifically how
these countries interpret their obligations under Article II.99
Hopefully, spacefaring States will realize that mechanisms that
drive international coordination, such as the development of
routine safety standards, are the key components in maintaining
international stability in the advent of extraterrestrial resource
extraction. All things considered, Title IV is an important step
forward, but it should not be overplayed as it still only represents
“one small step” in this emerging sphere of space exploration. But
with time, this one small step may eventually reflect “one giant
leap” for the future of resource extraction in outer space.
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